Publication

Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application

Journal Article (2023)

Journal

IEEE Control Systems Letters

Pages

3417-3422

Volume

7

Doc link

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2023.3285532

File

Download the digital copy of the doc pdf document

Abstract

We consider a large population of decision makers that choose their evolutionary strategies based on simple pairwise imitation rules. We describe such a dynamic process by the replicator dynamics. Differently from the available literature, where the payoffs signals are assumed to be updated continuously, we consider a more realistic scenario where they are updated occasionally. Our main technical contribution is to devise two event-triggered communication schemes with asymptotic convergence guarantees to a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how our proposed approach is applicable as an efficient distributed demand response mechanism.

Categories

control theory, optimisation.

Author keywords

game theory

Scientific reference

J.P. Martínez, W. Ananduta, C. Ocampo-Martínez, S. Grammatico and N. Quijano. Population games with replicator dynamics under event-triggered payoff provider and a demand response application. IEEE Control Systems Letters, 7: 3417-3422, 2023.