Publication

A payoff dynamics model for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games

Journal Article (2022)

Journal

Automatica

Pages

110227

Volume

140

Doc link

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110227

File

Download the digital copy of the doc pdf document

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games under general affine equality and convex inequality constraints. In particular, we design a novel payoff dynamics model to steer the decision-making agents to a generalized Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, i.e., to a self-enforceable state where the constraints are satisfied and no agent has incentives to unilaterally deviate from her selected strategy. Moreover, using Lyapunov stability theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the corresponding equilibria set in stable population games. Auxiliary results characterizing the properties of the equilibria set are also provided for general continuous population games. Furthermore, our theoretical developments are numerically validated on a Cournot game considering various market-related and production-related constraints.

Categories

control theory, optimisation.

Author keywords

game theory

Scientific reference

J.P. Martínez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martínez. A payoff dynamics model for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games. Automatica, 140: 110227, 2022, to appear.