Publication
A payoff dynamics model for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games
Journal Article (2022)
Journal
Automatica
Pages
110227
Volume
140
Doc link
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2022.110227
File
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games under general affine equality and convex inequality constraints. In particular, we design a novel payoff dynamics model to steer the decision-making agents to a generalized Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, i.e., to a self-enforceable state where the constraints are satisfied and no agent has incentives to unilaterally deviate from her selected strategy. Moreover, using Lyapunov stability theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the corresponding equilibria set in stable population games. Auxiliary results characterizing the properties of the equilibria set are also provided for general continuous population games. Furthermore, our theoretical developments are numerically validated on a Cournot game considering various market-related and production-related constraints.
Categories
control theory, optimisation.
Author keywords
game theory
Scientific reference
J.P. Martínez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martínez. A payoff dynamics model for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in population games. Automatica, 140: 110227, 2022.
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