IRI - A payoff dynamics model for equality-constrained population games

Publication

A payoff dynamics model for equality-constrained population games

Journal Article (2022)

Journal

IEEE Control Systems Letters

Pages

530-535

Volume

Doc link

https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2021.3082865

File

Download the digital copy of the doc pdf document

Authors

Projects associated

L-BEST: Supervision and fault-tolerant control of smart infrastructures based on advanced learning and optimization

Abstract

This letter proposes a novel form of continuous-time evolutionary game dynamics for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in equality-constrained population games. Using Lyapunov stability theory and duality theory, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee the asymptotic stability, non-emptiness, compactness, and optimality of the equilibria set of the proposed dynamics for certain population games. Moreover, we illustrate our theoretical developments through a numerical simulation of an equality-constrained congestion game.

Author keywords

game theory

Scientific reference

J.P. Martínez, N. Quijano and C. Ocampo-Martínez. A payoff dynamics model for equality-constrained population games. IEEE Control Systems Letters, 6: 530-535, 2022.